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tions. The states retain their full rights, in accor-
dance with the domestic legislation, to supervise
and control the trans frontier cooperation of their
territorial communities and their authorities. Any
provisions in such agreements that violate the
domestic legislation are null and void, which again
confirms the supremacy of the sovereign state in
determining the type, mode and scope of
transfrontier cooperation. In order for
transfrontier cooperation to proceed in ways that
are as similar as possible to interregional coop-
eration within the country's borders, it is impor-
tant that both sides to an agreement should have
information about the bodies that supervise the
work of the territorial communities and their au-
thorities. For this reason, each country should
make this information available to the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe. The states un-
dertake to promote and facilitate transfrontier
cooperation, seeking to resolve problems and re-
move obstacles that may impede it and to bring
such cooperation as far as possible in line with
interregional cooperation inside the state borders.
Therefore, the states agree to supply all the rel-
evant information to their own local and regional
authorities and to the foreign countries with which
The Masses in the Streets of
Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania
and Romania Reveal Once
Again the Balkans as
a Hotbed of Danger to
Europe's Security
In four countries of Southeast Europe
(Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania, Romania), thousands
of angry people flooded the streets of Belgrade,
Sofia, Tirana and Bucharest last autumn, turning
the Balkans yet again into a new European neu-
ralgic spot, in which old historical and political
prejudices are permanently at loggerheads with
new economic and democratic challenges. Once
the Balkans always the Balkans, concluded many
uninformed sceptics, although many of the major
CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
they conclude agreements on trans frontier coop-
eration.
The provisions for the coming into force of
the Outline Convention are standard provisions
like those for all the other conventions of the
Council of Europe.
Given the wide range of freedom that the
Outline Convention on Transfrontier Coopera-
tion leaves to the contracting parties on the local
level, without at all affecting the state sovereignty
and fully preserving the right of the state to su-
pervise and control the implementation of agree-
ments and arrangements between neighbouring
regions in different countries, it seems reasonable
to conclude that such cooperation can only be
beneficial to the countries involved, since the de-
velopment of each country, in the nature of things,
is dependent on the development of its smaller
parts or regions. Therefore, rather than viewing
transfrontier cooperation as an attempt to destroy
the central authority and deprive the state of part
of its sovereignty, I believe that it is a step for-
ward towards progress and democracy and a sure
way for any country to integrate itself into a wider
European community.
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differences that marked these tumultuous events
may be as important as were their numerous simi-
larities. At the same time, their main characteris-
tics - social and political crisis, the defeat of the
new ,lites and the general impotence of the West
- have made manifest that this is a specific regional
transition crisis, and is - as opposed to the inevi-
table collapse of Yugoslavia - only parenthetically
marked by heated national, state or boundary is-
sues, such as used to be considered crucial in the
past in the theoretical assessments of similar vio-
lent syndromes in the Balkans.
After the collapse of communism, all of
these countries found themselves in unknown ter-
ritory (Europe) and a hostile environment (chal-
lenges of transition), and questions of everyday
subsistence far outweighed matters of the heart
and patriotic zeal. At the same time, the way in
which power was exercised and the degree of re-
spect for fundamental human and democratic
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rights became much more important than the
ideological affiliations of the power-holders and
their ruling parties. In places where the new fig-
ures (Presidents of Bulgaria and Romania,
Stoyanov and Constantinescu) made possible
some very unusual things (the voluntary with-
drawal of the crypto-communists in Bulgaria; dras-
tic economic reforms in Romania), politics was
restored to politicians, and the streets became
once more empty, irrespective of the fact that
these are extremely vague promises and that,
should they fail, the circle of violence may be re-
peated: in both Bulgaria and Romania the over-
all economic situation is so miserable that it is
highly unlikely it might be improved with mere
economies and severity measures, without mas-
sive foreign assistance.
And yet, Sofia and Bucharest have the good
fortune at the moment of enjoying a much-needed
civilizational respite, while Albania may be irre-
versibly ruined and Serbia is still to face the final
showdown. The old rulers who managed to stay
in power (Milosevic in Serbia and Berisha in Al-
bania) have saved their positions so far by half-
way concessions (Berisha by yielding to the de-
mand to dismiss his Prime Minister and by invit-
ing international forces, while Milosevic got away
with electoral fraud by passing a lex specialis).
However, all the main open issues have remained
unresolved - even though the international com-
munity still needs Berisha to prevent complete
disintegration and collapse of Albania, and needs
Milosevic to prevent Yugoslavia from following
Albania's example and dissolving in bloodshed
and chaos and to preserve the fragile Dayton truce
in Bosnia.
Thus, the new Balkan divisions do not fol-
low the old religious, historical and political pat-
terns, even though both Albania and the self-
styled Yugoslavia have similar geo-strategic back-
grounds: while in the communist flock, they were
independent and self reliant states which escaped
from under the Soviet umbrella at an early date,
although the isolated and autocratic Albania can-
not be compared with the much opener, freer and
richer ex-Yugoslavia. In these Balkan parallels,
Belgrade fell victim to its ambitions of conquest
rather than as a direct consequence of its politi-
calor economic legacy. This circumstance also
demonstrates that in Serbia's case "crypto-com-
munism" is a repeat performance of the
"Mussolini syndrome" (from utopian socialism to
fascist conquest), while Albania - but also Bul-
garia and Romania - represent cases of doubly
disjoined communities: they lost their geo-strate-
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gic and economic backing - for whatever it was
worth - but did not know how to place the eman-
cipated individual into the focus of the new soci-
ety, how to ensure his life in dignity, and how to
abandon once for all the model of arbitrary and
autocratic government.
For the newly-formed political ,lites, in all
these countries the freshly attained freedom
turned into a suicidal curse: they were left to their
own devices, without the shield of a super-
civilizational and super-ethnic umbrella, as was
the case in the times of the Ottoman Empire,
Austro-Hungary or the Soviet Union. As a result,
left to assimilation with themselves and with their
peoples, they began to behave according to the
despotic rules of those who assimilated them in
the past. Europe and America generally de-
manded and prescribed more than they gave and
forgave; yet, they remained the only mainstays,
and consequently, after the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the only real-
life enemy (apart from the historic foes from the
blood-spattered Balkan photograph album) was
to be found in their own midst. And here the circle
is closed: the liberators have become the oppres-
sors, and the liberated have become rebels, with
their feeling that everything ought to be different
after the fall of communism. This tension is the
product of three simultaneous tragedies: the states
feel let down, the people feel robbed and disin-
herited, and the power-holders misunderstood
and threatened precisely by those they had
counted on the most: the ungrateful people and
the cynical West. To this explosive mix should be
added also sweeping economic crisis,whose bane-
ful general features are perceivable in all the men-
tioned countries: high inflation, unbalanced bud-
gets, large trade deficits, limited state revenues,
obsolete infrastructure, lack of fresh money, high
unemployment, a deficient legal system, high po-
litical and ethnic tensions, and a sweeping, eco-
nomic and political, domination of a "parallel",
"black" or "underground" system which subjects
all the major decisions to its own criminal rules of
the game.
In such communities, two fundamental sa-
cred principles are invariably violated: the sanc-
tity of electoral results and the protection of so-
cial dignity. In Albania, it all started back in May
1996,with the general denouncement of the elec-
toral fraud, which the most powerful world fac-
tors (the European Union, the OSCE, the USA)
first sharply condemned and then nonetheless
swallowed in a revised edition (Berisha became
even stronger after repeated elections in 17 dis-
38
puted constituencies), and also in Serbia, after
several months of street protests, provoked even
more directly by election-rigging. In Bulgaria, at
the same time, legal, but wrong, elections were
practically annulled in a strange "non-parliamen-
tary" fashion: due to public protest and the
President's resistance, the ruling Socialists could
not form a government and had to consent to an
early general election.
However much Sofia might appear an em-
barrassing exception, this case demonstrates that
the idea of the inviolability of democratic sover-
eignty has prevailed in all three countries, so that
it may be justified to speak of a specific demo-
cratic spring at the end of another lost Balkan
decade. This annulment of the original political
will is inexorably attended by the equally perni-
cious abandonment of social security: strict cen-
tralization, family, tribal and regional ties; the
predominance of contraband trade and smug-
gling; general crisis of law and order; and the col-
lapse of accountability, in a situation of absolute
domination of politics over the economy have
switched off all safety mechanisms of responsible
capitalism even before these had even started to
act in any of these places.
As a result, while the West refers in gen-
eral terms to "belated reforms", the East is suf-
fering of a severe case of "entrepreneurship
chaos", with an inadmissible degree of social
stratification.
Thus there is not much difference between
the average Bulgarian salary of twenty-odd, the
Albanian salary of a hundred and the Yugoslav
salary of two hundred dollars a month, because
all of them are closed and backward economies,
deteriorating without any firm rules of operation.
They are not building up a new system by open-
ing new possibilities, and represent a kind of "Wild
West", since even the former laissez-faire system
provided perhaps more social self-discipline. This
type of commodity and investment market where
confusion reigns holds a certain attraction because
of its rudimentary nakedness. Thus, in a promo-
tional leaflet, a London company openly states
that greatest profits are to be made at the very
beginning, when prices on the property market
go down and general conditions prove the old rule:
the more numerous the foreign visitors, the more
comfortable the hotels and the streets cleaner and
safer - the lower are the final profits.
These rules of investment encourage nepo-
tism, corruption and organized crime, so that, for
instance, the whole Montenegrin economy is
based on smuggling across the Adriatic, while the
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relatively orderly Macedonia almost went bank-
rupt because of investments into Albanian pyra-
mid financial schemes. This provides fertile soil
for international criminal activities - from arms
to drugs -while, on the other hand, the strict rules
imposed by the International Bank or the IMF
are only too often conditioned by drastic systemic
demands which go far beyond the political endur-
ance of the generally underprivileged and impov-
erished citizens. The "most disciplined" govern-
ments in this respect are often the most unpopu-
lar, thereby creating new vicious circles of hope-
lessness. In March this year, the conservative op-
position brought out into the streets of Budapest
50,000 people by inviting them to resist the "new
colonialism" and the "international financial in-
stitutions" .
As for the equally harmful Atlantic policy
of "opposing national rear mirrors", which has
made many bad things even worse, much is being
said - but little is being done. Many European
governments tend to be more concerned with what
happened in the past than what the new times -
for better or for worse - could and should bring to
each of them and to all of them together. Habits
feed prejudice and dogma reinforces misconcep-
tions, so that, in both the Serb and the Albanian
stories, the same kind of mistakes are made all
over again, those which marked the bloody
Yugoslav episode: permanently too late, always
too little, narrow-minded as a rule, and only ex-
ceptionally far-sighted.
Many claim that the world today is charac-
terized by a leadership crisis and a crisis of con-
ceptions: more and more people are ceasing to
believe in Fukuyama's optimism, though unable
to accept Huntington's pessimism. They know that
there has been no democratic end to history but
are not sure what they themselves could and
should do if the Balkans are really the scene of a
clash of worlds and civilizations. That is why they
are afraid of any resolute programme, so that,
striving to maintain control, they opt for compro-
mises that hold the least risk, such as do not dis-
tinguish between good and evil, the future and
the past, the individual and the state. They know
how to assume control but not how to maintain
it, how to win elections but not how to conduct
world affairs.
Thus, in these very sensitive times of tran-
sition, we are indeed faced with the conflict of
democratic and autocratic models, on the one
hand, and with a clash between a sort of post-so-
cialist pre-civilizational entrepreneurship and dis-
putable moral and social values, on the other. In
Croatia - an Open Country
Vanja Kalogjera*
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this, the scales of history may still tilt to either
side, and the hands on the clock of civilization be
turned back for several decades. It would be nec-
essary, for this reason, to think in bolder terms
about a contemporary equivalent to the Marshall
Plan and about a more spacious Atlantic umbrella.
What especially recalls the old times in all this is
the fact that European security is today more
threatened by the current turmoil in the Balkans
than by the Russian appetites in the past, and the
West would do well to adapt its new tactical and
strategic parameters to these new conditions.
In this general confusion, Serbia is still con-
sidered very important strategically; Romania is
Like other Central and East European
countries, Croatia is passing through a highly com-
plex period of transformation from a centralised
to a market economy. This process was made even
harder by the armed conflict that was raging in
these parts and that ended only two years ago. In
the coming weeks, the last occupied section of
Croatia - the Croatian Danubian Region - will be
fully integrated into the administrative and legal
system of the Republic of Croatia, by peaceful
means this time.
The major task to be accomplished in the
transformation of the Croatian economy isbeyond
doubt the privatisation of the former social en-
terprises.
Ever since Croatia gained independence,
one of the main proclaimed goals of economic
policy was to attract foreign investments. Even
while the fighting was still going on, this orienta-
tion attained certain results. The end of the war
gave impetus to more investment in Croatia. To
encourage such activity, Croatia enacted a law in
1995which provided to foreign investors the same
terms as were offered to domestic investors, and
even some privileges.
The Constitution guarantees foreign inves-
tors the free repatriation of profits from capital
• The author is the Director of the Croatian Investment
Promotion Agency, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia, Dubrovnik
Avenue 15; phone (+3851) 6554 560, fax (+ 3851) 6554
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being promised membership in NATO, Bulgaria
support to economic recovery, while Albania has
already been declared a model EU-cooperant and
a trusted member of the Partnership for Peace.
However, all that has taken place so far in this
group of countries demonstrates beyond any
doubt that tacit support to latter-day autocrats is
a most perilous compromise, to which the West
takes recourse too lightly and too often. Economic
assistance is important, but it would seem that
these days the protection of basic human dignity
has become even more important. And if this is
so -we are no longer telling a typical Balkan story.
•
invested in Croatia. Practically all economic sec-
tors are open to foreign investors, with restrictions
only in the defence industry and the communica-
tion media. The profit tax is relatively low (35
percent). Under the mentioned Law, foreign in-
vestors are exempted from import charges on
equipment brought into Croatia as part of the in-
vestment project, of course subject to certain con-
ditions, but these are also liberal: the investment
must not cover a period shorter than five years;
the foreign share in the investment cannot be less
than one-fifth of the total amount, and the ben-
efit does not apply to equipment for games of
chance.
Even while the fighting was still going on,
economic policies were designed so as to estab-
lish a favourable setting for investments - both
long-term and short-term. The Croatian currency,
the kuna, has been practically convertible from
the moment it was launched into circulation. In-
flation has been reduced to less than four and a
half percent annually, not only this year but also
last year and the one before. A legal system is
being evolved that guarantees the security of in-
vestments and full respect of contractual obliga-
tions.
To date, after seven years, foreign invest-
ments to the value of almost two billion
Deutschmark have been made in Croatia. Argu-
ments in favour of such projects are not just the
efficient macro-economic policy but the advanta-
